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In 2005, a new system of judicial dissolution upon shareholder’s request 
became an important supplement of the new revision of Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China. This system, which is a crucial missing link of the in-and-out 
system of company law, offers the final alternative when the shareholder in the 
company deadlock seeks for the national power. However, it is not only a barrier to 
the shareholder’s right protection in the judicial practice, but also very harmful to the 
justice and the authority of law when the court and the judge in different regions deals 
with the cases differently because of the lack of the manipulative regulations, 
supporting theory researches as well as the practice experience concerned. Therefore, 
the thesis pays attentions on these problems, parses the legislation text, analyses the 
judicial practice, and puts forward some proposals, with the intention to reinforce the 
system in practice. 
The thesis consists of three chapters. 
Chapter One, the legislation analysis of the system. According to the analysis of 
the 183 article of the new Company Law of PRC, the author brings forward an idea 
that the purpose of introducing in this new system does not mean to protect the rights 
and interests of the minority shareholders. Instead, it is brought in and geared into the 
company law system with the focus on forming a complete system framework of 
shareholders’ in and out. Then, the author re-defines and analyses the concept of 
“Company Deadlock” to demonstrate the significant value of the establishment of this 
new system. However, every system has its costs and limitation. As a new established 
system of Company Law of PRC, judicial dissolution upon shareholder’s request is 
probably abused in the practice. 
Chapter two, the analysis and summary of the judicial practice. The author 
analyses on the judicial documentation as well as the reports on mess media, which 
concerned the judicial dissolution cases registered after this system established, and 
lists the characteristic factors and the problems exists while probing into the reasons. 
Because the lack of manipulative legislation as well as the alternative system as 














and supports to the further legislation with their attempts in the judiciary practice. 
However, the differences which weaken the dignity of law are to be unified. 
Chapter three, the reinforcement of the system. Based on the former analysis, in 
this chapter, the author stands at the court’s position and probes into the idiographic 
aspects of the application of this new system. It is an indispensable system for 
Chinese shareholders, while in the judicial practice to apply this system, the balance 
principle and last-resort principle should be followed, and the standards and methods 
should be unified, thus reinforcing the new system as well as preventing it from being 
misunderstood or abused. 
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2005 年 10 月 27 日，第十届全国人大常委会第十八次会议审议通过了新修















































































































































                                                        
① 如 2002 年修订的《美国标准商事公司法》（Model Business Corporation Act）第 14.30 节.司法解散事由。 
② 《美国标准商事公司法》（Model Business Corporation Act）第 14.31 节.司法解散程序 （d）小节便提到
针对这一情况的处理程序：“如果公司股票未在全国性的证券交易所上市或者未在由一个或者多个全国性
的或者关联证券联合会会员主持的市场上经常交易的 10 日内，该公司须向申请人之外的所有股东送出通知










































                                                        
① 如苏伟文与吴海怡股东权纠纷上诉案，便是大股东诉小股东的案例。见广东省佛山市中级人民法院
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